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Evidence
by Marc T. Treadwell
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the survey year from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit continued
its recent trend of limiting the number of its published opinions, a trend
discussed in more detail in a previous survey.2 This Survey will address
However, readers
several unpublished-yet noteworthy-decisions.
should bear in mind Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2, which provides that
"[u~npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they
may be cited as persuasive authority."3 Also note that the court's
internal operating procedures suggest an even more limited role for
unpublished opinions:
The court generally does not cite to its "unpublished" opinions
because they are not binding precedent. The court may cite to them
where they are specifically relevant to determine whether the
predicates for res judicata, collateral estoppel, or double jeopardy exist
in the case, to ascertain the law of the case, or to establish the
procedural history or facts of the case.4

*

Partner in the firm of Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, P.C., Macon, Georgia. Valdosta

State University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
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1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit evidence law during the prior survey period, see
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 2008 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1211
(2009).
2. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 2007 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 59 MERCER L. REV.
1181 (2008).
3. ITH CiR. R. 36-2.
4. FED. R. App. P. 36, 11TH CIR. I.O.P. 7.

1113

1114

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

II. ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS
In many previous surveys of both Eleventh Circuit and Georgia
evidence decisions, the Author has placed discussion of spoliation cases
in the section about presumptions.5 This is because historically the
"adverse inference" presumption has been the remedy for spoliation of
evidence. Specifically, if a party destroys or spoliates evidence, the jury
can be charged that they may infer that the evidence, if it were
available, would be harmful to the spoliator.' However, as discussed in
more recent surveys, courts have become increasingly aggressive and
creative in fashioning sanctions for spoliation of evidence.7 This year
was no exception in the Eleventh Circuit.
In Graff v. Baja Marine Corp.," the plaintiffs contended that a
motorboat's "gimbal housing" fractured under normal operating
conditions. The plaintiffs alleged that when the gimbal housing
fractured, the boat spun out of control, ejecting the plaintiffs' decedent
from the boat. The defendants contended that the gimbal housing
fractured as a result of a severe impact, which in turn was caused by the
operator's misuse. Shortly after the incident, a team of experts hired by
the plaintiffs removed the gimbal housing and conducted destructive
testing on a portion of the gimbal housing without first notifying the
defendants. Not surprisingly, when the defendants learned of the
destructive testing, they contended that the plaintiffs, by allowing their
experts to destroy evidence, had spoliated evidence. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed and excluded
evidence of the test results. Without this evidence, the plaintiffs could
not prove a product defect, and therefore, the district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants.9
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that exclusionary sanctions were
inappropriate. ° The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the

5. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 2005 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 57 MERCER L. REV.
1083, 1089-91 (2006); Marc T, Treadwell, Evidence, 1997 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 49
MERCER L. REV. 1027, 1031-32 (1998); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 61 MERCER L. REV. 135, 136-38 (2009); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence,Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 135, 136-38 (2008); Marc T. Treadwell,
Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 49 MERCER L. REV. 149, 151-52 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 225 Ga. App. 523,525, 484 S.E.2d 249,
251 (1997).
7. See supra note 5.
8. 310 F. App'x 298 (11th Cir. 2009).
9. Id. at 300-02.
10. Id. at 301.
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plaintiffs' experts spoliated evidence." The defendants were prejudiced
by this destructive testing because the gimbal housing was the critical
evidence in the case. 2 Moreover, the plaintiffs' experts used test
samples smaller than recommended by industry standards and thus
wasted what little material was available for testing. Consequently,
they eliminated any opportunity to conduct more reliable tests. Whether
or not the plaintiffs acted with malice, they clearly were more culpable
than the defendants. 3 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the test results from
evidence.4
The decision in Graff is one of the most recent of an increasing
number of Georgia and Eleventh Circuit decisions imposing exclusionary
sanctions against both plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases for
spoliating evidence."6 Smart lawyers will learn from these cases and
rethink the way they, their clients, and their experts handle critical
evidence.

III.

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY

Federal Rule of Evidence 40416 is the principal rule governing the
admissibility of "extrinsic act evidence"-evidence of acts and transactions other than the one at issue-offered for substantive, as opposed to
impeachment, purposes." Rule 404 is intended to prevent the admission of evidence of prior misconduct solely to prove that a defendant is
more likely to have committed the charged offense."8 However, Rule
404's prohibition against extrinsic act evidence is subject to broad
exceptions.' 9 Although not admissible to prove a party's propensity to
engage in misconduct, extrinsic act evidence is admissible "for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." ° Viewed in a
practical light, it is easy to see why Rule 404 restricts the admission of
extrinsic act evidence. In a close case, evidence that a defendant
committed other crimes can have a profound impact on jurors. For

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.

15.

See supra note 5.

16.
17.

FED. R. EVID. 404.
Id.

18. See id.
19.
20.

See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Id.
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example, jurors will likely take a dim view of a defendant with a long
"rap sheet." Jurors may discern a propensity on the part of such a
defendant to commit crimes, or they may conclude that a man of his
character must be guilty.
As discussed in previous surveys, Rule 404(b) once played a significant
and frequent role in Eleventh Circuit evidence decisions. 21 This has not
been the case in recent years, and the same is true for the current
survey period. Only two Eleventh Circuit decisions addressing Rule
404(b) merit discussion-and then only briefly. In United States v.
Kapordelis,22 which involved a truly sordid affair concerning a Georgia
anesthesiologist's obsession with child pornography, 23 the defendant
contended that evidence of the defendant's sexual relations with minors
in the Czech Republic was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b)
because his conduct was legal in the Czech Republic. Therefore, the
defendant argued that because there was no crime or wrong, there was
no evidence admissible under Rule 404(b).24 The Eleventh Circuit
dismissed this argument.25 By its plain language, Rule 404(b) applies
to "'other crimes, wrongs, or acts'" and thus is not limited to criminal
acts.26 The fact that the defendant's conduct may have been lawful in
the Czech Republic did not mean that evidence of those acts was
inadmissible to prove the defendant committed the offenses charged in
the United States.
Further, evidence of his conduct in the Czech
Republic was relevant to a legitimate issue and was not offered simply
to prove bad character.28 The defendant denied taking pornographic
pictures of minors and claimed that someone else must have downloaded
the pictures to his computer.29 The fact that he engaged in sexual
relations with minors was admissible to refute his argument that it
could not have been him who took pornographic pictures of children or
downloaded such pictures to his computer.30
By its terms, Rule 404(b) applies to evidence of other or extrinsic
acts;31 therefore, evidence of acts "inextricably intertwined" with the

21. See, e.g., Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 1990 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 42 MERCER
L. REV. 1451, 1455-61 (1991).
22. 569 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1315 (2010) (mem.).
23. Id. at 1298.
24. Id. at 1312.
25. Id. at 1314.
26. Id. at 1313 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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charged offense is not considered extrinsic act evidence for purposes of
Rule 404(b), a point made by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Covington.32 In Covington the defendant was charged with attempting
to procure a "hit" on his girlfriend in an effort to prevent her from
testifying in a state criminal proceeding. In the state court proceeding,
the defendant had been charged with beating his girlfriend and
threatening her with a gun. At trial in the federal proceeding, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida admitted
recorded phone calls and correspondence between the defendant and his
girlfriend discussing the beating, the pistol that the defendant brandished during the beating, and the girlfriend's testimony about the
beating. The defendant contended that this was evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts, and it should not have been admitted in his trial
for charges relating to the attempted murder of his girlfriend. 3 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed.34 The beating and the charges resulting
from the beating provided the underlying motive for the attempted
murder, and therefore, evidence related to the beating was "'necessary
to complete the story of the crime.'" 35 Further, this evidence tended to
prove the defendant's motive for wanting his girlfriend dead.36
Although the Eleventh Circuit held that the evidence was "admissible
under Rule 404(b),"3 v it would have been just as accurate to say that
Rule 404(b) did not apply because the evidence was not, in fact, extrinsic
to the charged offense.
The Federal Rules' version of a rape shield statute is found in Federal
Rule of Evidence 412.38 In United States v.Sarras,a9 the defendant
contended that the district court erred when it refused to allow him to
cross-examine his minor victim about her subsequent sexual relations
with her boyfriend. The defendant contended that the prosecution
opened the door to this testimony when the victim testified that she had
been traumatized by the defendant's sexual abuse, which involved
photographs depicting the victim engaged in sexual acts with an adult

32. 565 F.3d 1336, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 564(2009) (mem.).
33. Id. at 1340-42.
34. Id. at 1342.
35. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. FED. R. EVID. 412. In 1994 Congress amended Rule 412 to make it applicable to
civil proceedings involving alleged sexual misconduct. Pub. L. 103-322, § 40141(v), 108
Stat. 1796, 1919 (1994). Notably, Georgia's rape shield statute, section 24-2-3 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), applies only to criminal proceedings.
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3 (1995 & Supp. 2009).
39. 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009).

1118

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

male.4" The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument for
several reasons.4 1 First, the victim could have been traumatized by the
defendant's sexual abuse regardless of whether she had other sexual
relations. 2 In other words, the mere fact that she had sexual relations
was not necessarily relevant to the question of whether she had been
traumatized. Second, the fact that the victim may have had sexual
relations did not tend to prove that the victim had not been sexually
abused.43 Indeed, the photographs established sexual abuse; the only
question was whether the defendant was the male seen in the photographs.44 Finally, the defendant had ample opportunity to crossexamine the victim about any possible motives for false allegations that
the defendant had sexually abused her.45
IV. ARTICLE VII. OPINION TESTIMONY

Seventeen years have passed since the United States Supreme Court
held in Daubert v.Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 46 that the Federal
Rules of Evidence preempted the long established "general acceptance"
test for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. 47 To review
briefly, the Supreme Court in Daubert made district judges gatekeepers
with the assigned task of keeping unreliable expert opinions out of
courtrooms.48 In 2000 the principles of Daubert were codified in Article
VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 49 Amended Rule 701 makes clear
that lay witnesses cannot give opinion testimony "based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702."'° In other words, the reliability requirements imposed by
Daubert on expert testimony cannot be avoided by a lay witness label.5'
Amended Rule 702 basically codified the Dauberttest and requires that
expert testimony be "based upon sufficient facts or data," must be the
"product of reliable principles and methods," and those "principles and
methods [must be applied] reliably to the facts of the case." 52 Amended

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1212-13.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 597.
Pub. L. 93595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (1974).
FED. R. EVID. 701.
FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.
FED. R. EVID. 702.

2010]

EVIDENCE

1119

Rule 703 provides that facts or data, although relied upon by an expert,
cannot be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the testimony unless
the court determines that the probative value of the facts or data "in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect."53
It became clear that the Daubert decision and the new rules, by
setting a new standard for the admission of expert testimony, dramatically changed the landscape of pretrial practice given that such issues
are generally fought prior to trial. Whether one agrees or disagrees with
the standard, it is clear today that Daubert requires district judges to
vigorously scrutinize expert witnesses and their opinions. 4
Daubert seminar speakers looking for locker-room humor to spice up
their boring subject matter will have a field day with the Eleventh
55
Circuit's decision in United States v. Sarras.
The opinion does,
however, offer a serious message-proponents of expert testimony need
to understand the precise focus of the attack on their experts and
respond accordingly.
In Sarras the principal evidence against the defendant for child
pornography offenses was a photograph, taken from the defendant's
laptop computer, of a penis-allegedly the defendant's penis. 6 Accordingly, the principal issue at trial became one of identification-whether,
in fact, the photograph depicted the defendant's penis.57 To refute the
prosecution's claim that the photograph showed his penis, the defendant
retained a doctor who was an acknowledged expert in the field, given
that he had examined 15,000 penises. 8 Based upon a comparison of
veins visible in the laptop photograph with defense photographs of the
defendant's penis, the expert concluded that the laptop photograph did
not depict the defendant's penis.5 9
In its Daubert motion, the prosecution couched the expert's opinion as
one based on "vein-comparison methodology.""
The prosecution
argued that Daubert required appropriate validation of the reliability of
this methodology in the medical or scientific community, and there was
none."1 Apparently, the defense never quite grasped the nature of the
prosecution's attack because it simply responded that its expert was,

53.

FED. R. EVID. 703.

54.

See Daubert,509 U.S. 579.

55.
56.
57.
58.

575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1197-98.
See id. at 1198-99.
Id. at 1205.

59.

Id. at 1199-1200.

60.
61.

Id. at 1210.
Id.
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based on his experience of examining 15,000 penises, qualified to render
an opinion on penis identification."2 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
clearly saw the distinction, noting that "Sarras fails to distinguish
between the doctor's qualifications to testify about penises and the
method by which the doctor reaches his conclusion."' There was, the
Eleventh Circuit noted, simply no evidence in the record validating "the
so-called methodology of comparing veins in erect penises as an
identification technique. Perhaps blood flow or degree of arousal has no
visual effect on the veins in penises. Who knows? The record is
silent.""
In short, the defense never addressed the prosecution's argument.
While it may be unlikely that the defense could produce peer-reviewed
scientific literature establishing the reliability of penis identification
based on vein mapping, the defense may well have been able to elicit
testimony from its expert, given his vast experience, as to why vein
comparison can be a reliable means of identification. However, because
the defense focused only on its expert's qualifications, and not on the
attack of his methodology, there was simply no evidence in the record to
refute the prosecution's contention that the expert's methodology did not
pass Daubert muster.6" Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
defendant's conviction.66
While most Daubert cases turn on the reliability requirement,
practitioners should not forget that Daubertalso requires a "fit" between
the proffered expert testimony and the relevant and pertinent issues in
the case.6 7 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Boca Raton Community
Hospital,Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp. took a careful and detailed
look at whether proffered expert testimony met this fit requirement. In
Boca Raton, the plaintiff, a not-for-profit hospital, sought to recover
damages allegedly resulting from a complicated Medicare fraud scheme
perpetuated by the defendant, a for-profit hospital chain. In a nutshell,
the plaintiff, with assistance from government investigators, demonstrated that the defendant improperly manipulated Medicare reimbursement
rates, not only defrauding the government, but also damaging other
hospitals because the skewed Medicare reimbursement rate resulted in

62.
63.

Id. at 1211.
Id.

64. Id.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 1221.
509 U.S. at 591-93.
582 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2009).
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underpayments to other hospitals. The problem faced by the plaintiff,
however, was quantifying its damages.69
After the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida excluded the plaintiff's expert damages testimony, the plaintiff
appealed, contending that the district court never fully understood its
theory of recovery. The plaintiff's expert witnesses went to great
lengths, using sophisticated methodologies, to calculate the defendant's
overcharges. ° The problem, however, was that the plaintiff's theory of
liability was limited to unlawful overcharges, and not all overcharges by
the defendant were unlawful.7 Therefore,
like an oversized coat, the expert opinion covered too much. Under
Boca's liability theory, it is not unlawful for hospitals to overcharge
(that is, to increase charges out of step with costs) as long as their
audited ratios do not fall below the low National Threshold. Because
Boca's expert opinion uses unaudited ratios to approximate Tenet's
actual costs, it includes the outlier payments Tenet got from lawful
overcharging, as well as unlawful overcharging, as part of Boca's
injuries and damages.72
Using an analogy to illustrate the fit problem, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that "[having tailored a trim-fitting liability theory for the body
of its case against Tenet, Boca cannot hang a baggy injury and damages
theory on it. " " Thus, because the plaintiff's expert opinion, no matter
how reliable its methodology, did not fit with the relevant issue, the
district court properly excluded the opinion."
A strong argument can be made that the most determinative factor in
the outcome of Daubert motions is whether the challenged expert, on the
one hand, or the attorney cross-examining the challenged expert, on the
other, is better prepared. This can be illustrated by comparing the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael"
and Judge Alaimo's opinion-one of his last before his death on
December 30, 2009-in Mascarenas v. Cooper 7ire & Rubber Co.76 In

69.

Id. at 1229-32.

70. See id. at 1232-33.
71. Id. at 1233.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1233-34. The Eleventh Circuit, although ruling for Tenet, made clear its
opinion of Tenet's conduct: "[Tihis case is about the economic harm [Tenet] did by
manipulating part of the Medicare program." Id. at 1229. "The record shows that Tenet
hospitals took advantage of a system designed to help pay for the sickest and least
fortunate patients to heal." Id. at 1234.
75. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
76. 643 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
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Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court held that Daubert applies to all expert
testimony and is not limited to scientific testimony.7 The Supreme
Court then affirmed the district court's conclusion that the plaintiff's
tire-failure expert's opinion that a tread separation was the result of
defective design and manufacture was not sufficiently reliable to satisfy
Daubert.7" The Supreme Court's conclusion was based on several
factors. Although the tire was five years old and had been driven seven
thousand miles in the two months since the plaintiffs bought the car, the
expert could not determine what impact wear and tear may have had on
the tire's failure.79 There was no evidence that the expert's methodology had been used by other experts in the field and thus no evidence of
its validity."0 Nor had he examined similar tires, and his examination
of the failed tire occurred only on the morning of his first deposition.8 '
In Mascarenasthe plaintiffs used the same expert who used the same
methodology to reach the same conclusion he reached in Kumho
Tire-that the tire was defective.82 This time, however, the outcome of
the defendants' Daubert challenge was different. Unlike his analysis in
Kumho Tire, this time the expert considered and rejected other possible
causes of the tire's failure, including the tire's history. In Mascarenas,
unlike in Kumho Tire, there was evidence that his methodology was a
valid and common methodology used by tire experts, and in fact, the
same methodology had been used by the defendants' expert. In
Mascarenas, unlike in Kumho Tire, he examined and tested exemplar
tires and performed extensive examinations of the failed tire. In short,
when retained in Mascarenasthe expert eliminated the defects noted by
the Supreme Court in his analysis.8 3 Consequently, Judge Alaimo
denied the defendant's Daubert motion seeking the exclusion of his
testimony.'
The emphasis in Daubert analysis on scientific reliability, as established by such things as testability and peer review, has sometimes led
to the erroneous conclusion that experience-based expert testimony can
never satisfy Daubert, a mistake made in American General Life

77. 526 U.S. at 141.
78. Id. at 142-43.
79. Id. at 154-55.
80. Id. at 157.
81. Id. at 155.
82. Compare Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (discussing the expert testimony of Dennis
Carlson), with Mascarenas, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (discussing the expert testimony of
Dennis Carlson).
83. 643 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
84. Id. at 1378.
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Insurance Co. v. Schoenthal Family, LLC. 5 In American General, the
beneficiaries of a life insurance policy argued that the insurer's
underwriting standards expert based his opinions solely on his experience in the industry, and the beneficiaries argued that experience alone
The
cannot establish the requisite reliability of expert testimony.'
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that standards for scientific reliability
do not necessarily apply to non-scientific expert testimony.8 7 Given the
expert's substantial education and experience in insurance matters,
particularly underwriting, the Eleventh Circuit held that the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia did not abuse
its discretion when it held that the expert's opinions were sufficiently
reliable to be admissible.'
V.

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY

It has been six years since the United States Supreme Court in
Crawford v.Washington 9 altered the playing field with regard to the
use of hearsay in criminal cases. In Crawford the defendant contended
that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear his wife's tape
recorded statement to police officers. The prosecution tendered this
evidence after the defendant's wife invoked her spousal privilege and
thus was unavailable to testify.' The trial court and the Washington
Supreme Court held that the circumstances of the statement were
sufficiently reliable to overcome the defendant's argument that the
admission of the out-of-court statement violated his Sixth Amendment 9
right of confrontation.92 The prosecutors argued that since the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts,93 courts have allowed the
admission of hearsay statements if the statements "fall within a 'firmly
rooted hearsay exception'" or if they "bear 'particularized guarantees of

85.
86.
87.
88.

555 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id. at 1338-39. See also Dishman v. Wise, 79 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (West) 1608 (M.D.

Ga. 2009), in which Judge Lawson noted "that experience may provide a sufficient
foundation for expert testimony." Id. at 1614 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee's note). However, if "'the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience,
then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why
that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably
applied to the facts.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note).
89. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
90. Id. at 40.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

92.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.

93.

448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
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trustworthiness.' 9 4 As discussed in many prior surveys, this bypass
around the Sixth Amendment came to be known in Georgia as the
"necessity exception" to the hearsay rule.9 For a time, it seemed the
rapid expansion of the necessity exception, to exaggerate only a bit, was
on the verge of supplanting live testimony entirely.96 In Crawford,
however, the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation is not limited to in-court testimony but also applies to
out-of-court "testimonial" statements.97 Testimonial statements include
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony, and "similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially." 9' Thus, a testimonial out-of-court statement is no
longer admissible if the defendant has not had an opportunity to crossexamine the declarant.9 9
The Supreme Court's holding in Crawford quickly called into question
the widespread practice of admitting laboratory test results into evidence
without the in-court testimony of the technician who actually performed
the tests, an issue addressed recently by the Georgia Court of Appeals
in Dunn v. State.10 ° In Dunn the defendant contended that the trial
court improperly allowed a laboratory supervisor to testify that a white
substance found in the defendant's possession contained methamphetamines. However, the supervisor did not actually perform the test
establishing the composition of the substance. Rather, the actual testing
was done by a technician. The prosecution contended that the supervisor's testimony was admissible because she reviewed the data from the
testing and came to an independent conclusion that the substance
contained methamphetamines. °1

94. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
95. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 2002 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 55 MERCER L. REV.
1219, 1219 (2003); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 56
MERCER L. REV. 235, 247-48 (2004); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 48 MERCER L. REV. 323, 351, 354 (1996).
96. Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV.
135, 174-75 (2008); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59
MERCER L. REV. 157, 181-82 (2007); Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 56 MERCER L. REV. 235, 247-48 (2004).
97. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51, 68.

98. Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 23;
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410)).
99. Id. at 68.

100. 292 Ga. App. 667, 665 S.E.2d 377 (2008). For additional discussion of this case,
see Marc. T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 61 MERCER L. REV. 135,
164-65 (2009).
101. 292 Ga. App. at 667-69, 665 S.E.2d at 378-79.
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The court of appeals noted that courts across the country had
struggled with this issue since the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford.'0 2 Some courts have held that laboratory reports are
essentially business or public records, and their admission does not
impinge the right of confrontation. 10 3 Other courts have reached an
opposite conclusion, ruling that a laboratory technician's test results are
testimonial and thus inadmissible.104 A third group of courts has
followed the reasoning of decisions holding that 911 calls are nontestimonial because they are "'a contemporaneous recordation of
observable events rather than the documentation of past events,'" and
thus do not run afoul of Crawford.'°5
In Dunn the supervisor's testimony was properly admitted because she
"came to her own independent conclusion that the substance was
methamphetamine based on the chemical 'fingerprint' from the [gas
chromatography mass spectrometer] GCMS test."" 6 The court then
noted the evolving Georgia authority allowing experts to base their
opinions on hearsay.'0 7 True enough, but this seemed to miss the
defendant's point. The question was not whether the test results were
hearsay but admissible pursuant to an exception allowing an expert to
rely on hearsay, but whether they were testimonial statements, the
admission of which violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
Although not entirely clear, the court's opinion suggests that it was
persuaded by the reasoning of the 911 cases and that routine laboratory
test results and conclusions of laboratory personnel based on laboratory
tests are not testimonial. °8 Quoting from one of those cases, the court
reasoned that "'the critical inquiry is not whether it might be reasonably
anticipated that a statement will be used at trial but the circumstances
under which the statement was made.'"'0 9 Thus, presumably, the
circumstances surrounding laboratory tests suggest that the tests are
more the recordation of observable events than documentation of past
events, and the admission of the results does not run afoul of Crawford.
If the Georgia Court of Appeals in Dunn intended to create an
exception to Crawford for "routine" laboratory test results, that effort
appears to have been in vain. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,"°

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 670, 665 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005)).
Id. (collecting cases).
Id. (quoting People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 139 (Cal. 2007)).
Id. at 671, 665 S.E.2d at 380.
Id.
See id. at 669-71, 665 S.E.2d at 379-80.
Id. at 672, 665 S.E.2d at 381 (quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 140).
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
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the United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 majority dropped the other
Crawford shoe and held that laboratory analysts' certificates of drug test
results fall within the scope of Crawford and thus are inadmissible."'
In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
these "affidavits," as the majority termed them, "are 'testimonial,'
rendering the affiants 'witnesses' subject to the defendant's right of
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.""' The Supreme Court
essentially answered the question by concluding that the certificates of
analysis were affidavits."' Affidavits are testimonial statements, the
precise out-of-court statements barred by Crawford.'
The majority rejected the argument that the Confrontation Clause
distinguishes between testimony recounting historical events and
dispassionate and neutral accounts of scientific testing."'
"This
argument is little more than an invitation to return to our overruled
decision in Roberts, which held that evidence with 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness' was admissible notwithstanding the
Confrontation Clause.""' The point of the Confrontation Clause, the
majority continued, is not that evidence be reliable but that the
reliability of evidence be determined by cross-examination."'7 In any
event, the majority did not accept, as a blanket proposition, that
scientific testing is necessarily neutral or reliable."" Not only is it
possible that analysts can harbor fraudulent intent, but they may also
be incompetent."' In short, the Constitution assures that confrontation is the appropriate means to test the reliability of analysts'
conclusions.12

The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that laboratory test
results were akin to official and business records that were admissible
at common law."' Such test results are not kept in the regular course
of business, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6),122 because

they are specifically prepared for use at trial.123

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

This distinction

Id. at 2542.
Id. at 2530.
Id. at 2532.
Id. at 2542.
Id. at 2536.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
Id.

118. Id.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 2537.
Id. at 2536.
Id. at 2538.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)).
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proved the majority's point. True business records are not Confrontation
Clause infirm because they are not testimonial.124 True business
records are not created to prove a fact at trial; they simply are prepared
as a part of the business's routine business activity.125 Results of
prove a
testing of seized drugs, on the other hand, are clearly offered to
126
fact critical to the defendant's guilt and thus are testimonial.
Finally, the majority addressed the argument that the practical
consequences of its holding would unduly burden the criminal justice
system. 2 7 Noting that many states had already adopted, after Crawford, rules similar to its holding, the majority stated that "[plerhaps the
best indication that the sky will not fall after today's decision is that it
has not done so already."12' The majority also noted that there were
practical alternatives available to lessen the burden of its holding and
still preserve a defendant's right to confrontation. 129 It is permissible,
the Court announced, for states to adopt rules requiring a defendant,
upon receipt of notice of the prosecution's intent to use a forensic
analysis report, to assert his Confrontation Clause right. 3 ' If a
defendant truly suspects the accuracy of the test results, he can,
pursuant to these "notice and demand" rules, insist that the analyst
appear at trial.' The Court said that nothing in its holding bars such
schemes.132
It seemed for a while that there was one more Crawford shoe to drop.
On the same day that the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in
Melendez-Diaz, the Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia1 33 to
address the following question:
[i]f a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a certificate of a forensic
laboratory analysis, without presenting the testimony of the analyst
who prepared the certificate, does the state avoid violating the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by providing that the
accused has a right to call the analyst as his own witness?134

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 2539-40.
Id.
See id. at 2540.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2541.
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Id.
Id.
Id.

133.
134.

129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009) (mem.).
Brief of Petitioners at I, Briscoe, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (No. 07-11191).
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At the January 11, 2010 oral argument in Briscoe, Justice Scalia
questioned why certiorari had been granted in Briscoe, suggesting that
Melendez-Diaz had answered the question.'3 5 Indeed, as discussed
above, it seems that Melendez-Diaz clearly countenanced "notice and
demand" statutes. Two weeks later, the Court, in a per curiam
memorandum opinion, acknowledged as much and in a one-sentence
decision remanded the case for further action by Virginia courts in light
of its decision in Melendez-Diaz.13 6
137
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Jiminez
addresses a now frequently encountered Crawford issue: may a law
enforcement officer recount out-of-court statements made to him, not for
the purpose of proving the truth of the statement, but rather to explain
the officer's conduct?13 8 The argument that such testimony is admissible to explain the officer's conduct is generally suspect and has been
firmly rejected by Georgia courts because it is only in the rarest of
circumstances "that a prosecution will properly concern itself with why
an investigating officer did something."' 39 Why a law enforcement
officer does something is generally not relevant to the issue of whether
a defendant committed a crime.14 ° Moreover, an incriminating statement by a confidential informant, for example, that "explains" why an
investigation centered on a defendant is highly prejudicial.'
Such
statements, it would seem, are classic testimonial hearsay. In United
States v. Arbolaez,'4 2 the Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that such
statements, even when purportedly offered to explain a law enforcement
officer's conduct, are still inadmissible hearsay.'
In Jiminez the defendant contended on appeal that the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida improperly allowed a
detective to testify about a co-conspirator's statement to the detective to
the effect that the defendant was a participant in a scheme to grow and
distribute marijuana. At trial, the defendant objected to this testimony
only on the grounds that it was hearsay-not on the grounds that it

135. Oral Argument at *58, Briscoe, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (No. 07-11191).
136. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (mem.).
137. 564 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
138. Id. at 1286-87.
139. Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 536, 314 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1984); see also Marc T.
Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 55 MERCER L. REV. 249, 274 (2003).
140. Teague, 252 Ga. at 536, 314 S.E.2d at 912.
141. Transcript of United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006).
142. 450 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006).
143. Id. at 1290.
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This is still a common mistake,

even though the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that a hearsay
objection does not preserve a Confrontation Clause objection.145
Because the defendant did not properly object to the testimony, the
standard of review for the defendant's appeal on this issue was plain
error.

146

In Jiminez police officers searched a house in which the defendant was
present and found considerable evidence of marijuana manufacture and
distribution. On the stand, the detective testified that the defendant
had admitted his role in the operation. On cross-examination, defense
counsel attacked the defendant's alleged confession, citing evidence that
the defendant had in his first interview denied any knowledge of the
operation. 4 7 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the defendant was
attempting to impeach the detective's credibility, suggesting that the
detective was lying about the circumstances surrounding the interviews
of the defendant. 4 ' On redirect, and in an effort to rehabilitate the
detective, the prosecution elicited the detective's testimony that he
reinterviewed the defendant because of information discovered in an
interview with the co-conspirator in which the accomplice detailed the
defendant's involvement in the operation. Thus, the prosecution argued,
the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the co-conspirator's
statement, but rather to explain why the detective reinterviewed the
defendant. 49
This, it would seem, is an example of the proper use of out-of-court
testimony to prove the reasons for an officer's conduct. While it may be
true that, generally speaking, why an investigator does something is not
relevant to the issue of a defendant's guilt, the reasons for conduct may
become relevant based upon the particular facts and circumstances of a
case. In Jiminez the defendant challenged the detective's credibility
apparently by raising suspicions about the detective's several interviews
of the defendant. 50 Thus, the reason why the detective reinterviewed
the defendant became relevant.'
He reinterviewed the defendant
because the co-conspirator gave a statement implicating the defen-

144. Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1286.
145. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1291 n.8; see also United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d
1324, 1333 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1032 (2009) (mem.).
146. Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1286.
147. Id. at 1283-84.
148. Id. at 1287.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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dant. 152 The fact that this evidence may have been highly prejudicial
does not necessarily make it inadmissible. 5 3 The Eleventh Circuit
held that because the probative non-hearsay value of the evidence was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the
district court properly allowed
the detective to testify about the co4
conspirator's statement.
In United States v. US Infrastructure, Inc., 55 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed appeals of convictions arising from Jefferson County,
Alabama's notorious sewer and wastewater treatment projects.156 The
prosecution alleged that the corporate defendant, US Infrastructure
(USI), and its defendant officers bribed county officials in an effort to
secure county contracts.'57 County Commissioner Jewell McNair had
been indicted with the defendants, but his case was severed from the
USI defendants. 58 At trial, another contractor testified that McNair
told him that USI's president had bribed him by helping him to pay his
mortgage. McNair told the contractor he needed help because USI had
stopped paying his mortgage. McNair asked the contractor to pick up
the bribe where USI had left off. The contractor then agreed to buy a
piece of art from McNair's private business, an art studio.'59 There
was some confusion over the basis for the admission of this testimony in
the district court. 6 ' The defendants assumed that the statement had
been admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)' 6 ' as a
co-conspirator statement162 On appeal, however, the prosecution
argued that the testimony was admissible as a statement against
6
interest pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3),6'
and that
was the argument considered by the Eleventh Circuit.'6
Rule 804(b)(3) contains three elements for the admission of a
statement against interest. First, the declarant must be unavailable. 6 Second, the declarant's statement must "'so far tend[] to

152. Id.
153. Id. at 1288.
154. Id.
155. 576 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010)
(No. 09-967).
156. Id. at 1202.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1203 n.1.
159. Id. at 1205.
160. See id. at 1207-08.
161. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2).
162. US Infrastructure,Inc., 576 F.3d at 1208.

163.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).

164. US Infrastructure,Inc., 576 F.3d at 1208.
165. Id.
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subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in his
position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true.'"'6 6 Finally, the statement must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.16 7
First, McNair's statement satisfied the unavailable criterion because
he was a co-defendant and could not be compelled to testify." Second,
McNair's admission to the contractor that USI had been paying his
mortgage was clearly against McNair's penal interest because it
suggested that he had been accepting bribes. 69 Finally, the circumstances surrounding the statement sufficiently established the trustworthiness of the statement. 171 McNair and the contractor had previously
conspired to fix county contracts and the contractor had paid bribes to
McNair. 71 ' Hence, the contractor was a confidant of McNair's.72
Although there is no indication that the defendants raised a Crawford
objection to the testimony, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless noted that
because the statement was part of a private conversation, it was not a
testimonial73 statement and therefore did not fall within the scope of
Crawford.1

166. Id. (quoting United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d 1073, 1077 (11th Cir. 1994)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1208.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1209.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.

